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IN THE SUPR.EMF. COTJP.T OF THP. STATF. OF' HTAH

~TATE

OF UTAH,

Plaintiff-P.esponnent,
-v-

Case No. 182!lR

BRYON nALE PBTERSON,

Defenoant-Appellant.

~RIEF

OF

RF.SPONDENT

---------STATEMF.NT OF THE NATURE OF THF.

CASE

The appellant, Bryon Dale Peterson, was charged with
one count of aggravated burglary, in violation of Utah Code
Ann.,

~

76-6-203 (1953), as amended, and two counts of

aggravated assault in violation of Utah Code

Ann.,~

76-5-10~

(1953), as amended, and was tried before a jury in the Seventh
Judicial District Court in and for Carbon County, the
Honorable non

v.

Tibbs presiding.
DISPOSITION IN THF: Il)WFR COURT

The jury found appellant guilty of aggravated
burglary, a first-degree felony, agqravated assault, a thirddegree felony, and assault, a Class B misdemeanor.

The trial

court sentenced appellant to iMprisonrnent in the Utah State
Prison for a term not less than five years,. which may be for
life, for aggravated burglary, toqether with a fine of
Sln,non~

for a term not to exceed five years for aggravated

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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assault: and for a term not to exceea six months for assault,
all terms to run concurrently.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks affirrnance of appellant's
conviction.
STA'.":'EMFN'I' OF. THE FACTS
Mrs. Sandra Dotson owned a home at 296 North 100
West,~~rice,

Utah (T. R).

Due to leg surgery she slept on a

couch in the livinq room, adjacent to the kitchen (T. 15).

In

the early morning of September 1, 1981, appellant entered
Sandra's home, walkeo through the kitchen, and then peered
through the doorway into the living room where Sandra was
sleeping (T. 11, 12).

Awakened by noises in the kitchen,

Sandra noticed the appellant in the doorway and asked "Who in
the hell are you?"

(T. 12, 13).

The appellant did not

respond: instead, he approached Sandra and placed both hands
around her neck

(T~

13, 15).

Sandra struggled, but the

appellant beat her about the head and face,
and then strangleo her ( T. Hi).

sat on her body

Due to this vie ious assault,

Sandra lost consciousness ('.":'. lR).
Tamm~

Dotson, Sandra's daughter, occupied a basement

bedroom immediately below the living room where her mother
slept (T. 43).

Tammy was awakened on the

~orning

of September

1, 19Rl by an alarm clock set for 6:30 a.m. and her mother's
-/.Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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scream, which occurred simultaneously.

She put on her robe,

walked up the stairs into the kitchen and saw from the doorway
the appellant sitting on top of her mother (T. 44).
Concerned, Tammy asked "Mom, are you alright?" (T. 46).

Her

mother did not answer, but the appellant turned and looked at
her (T. 47).

Tammy ran for the back door but appellant caught

her from behind by grabbing her wrist (T. 47).

The appellant

placed his hands around Tammy's neck and strangled her until
she lost consciousness (T. 47).

Moments later, Tammy regained

consciousness, saw appellant beating and choking her mother,
arrl then she ran out the back door to the home of a next-door
neighbor, Ed McKinney (T. 49).
At 6:20 a.m. on September 1, 1981, Ed McKinney was
awakened by screams corning from his front door (T. R9).
Answering his door, he was told by Tammy that something was
wrong at her house (T. 89).

Mr. McKinney ran to the house,

entered the back door and walked into the kitchen ( T. 89).
Mr. McKinney then observed the appellant lying over Sandra
Dotson ( T. 90).

Mr. McKinney asked "What the heck' s_ going on

here?" (T. 91).

The appellant responded "Nothing" and he then

got up, walked past Mr. McKinney and left through the back
door (T. 91-93).

A kitchen light clearly illuminated the

appellant's face as he left the Dotson home (T. 93).
Another neighbor, Richard Rathers, heard Tammy's
screams and approached the house (T. 100).

While in the

street in front of the Dotson home, Mr. Rathers saw appellant
-3Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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run from the house, get into an orange van and drive off (T.
101, 102).
At trial, both victims, Sandra and Tammy Dotson, ana
both neighbors, Ed McKinney ann Richard Rathers, positively
identified the appellant as the assailant who entered the
Dotson home on the morning of September 1, 1981 (T. 20, 46,
91, 104).

POIN'J:' I

THE TRIAL COURT PROPFRLY GRANTF.D
RF.:SPONDEN':r:''S JOINDF.R MOTION.

Appellant's claim of error arises from a series of
events which occurrea within two months of his necember 21,
1981 trial.
The original information filed against appellant
contained two counts of aggravated assault and one count of
aggravated hurglary.

nuring a November

Q,

lClfU preliminary

hearing, appellant was bound over only for the two counts of
aggravated assault.

Appellant was arraigned for the

aggravated assault charge on November 16, 1Q81 and trial was
set for November 21, 19Rl (T. 237).
On November 30, 1981, respondent refiled the
aggravated burqlary charge against appellant.

Both the

preliminary hearing and arraignment for the refiled charge
-4-
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were held on December 16, 1981.

Following the hearing,

appellant was bound over for the aggravated burglary charge
(T. 238).

On the following day, respondent moved the district

court to join the aggravated assault and aggravated burglary
charges.

The trial court granted the joinder motion on the

first day of trial, December 21, 1981 (T. 5).

Concerning the

joinder motion, the prosecuting attorney asserts that prior to
November 27, 1981, he communicated to appellant's counsel his
inten~ion

to both refile and join the aggravated burglary

charge (T. 246).

Appellant's counsel denies that any mention

was made of joining the refiled charge with the existing
charge (T. 249).
Based upon this summary of events, appellant
contends that he was unable to adequately prepare a defense to
the refiled aggravated burglary charge, and was thus
prejudiced by the trial court's joinder order.

Appellant's

claim, however, lacks merit.
Utah Code Ann., S 76-1-401 (1953), as amended,
provides in part that a:
"single criminal episode" means all
conduct which is closely related in time
and is incident to an attempt or an
accomplishment of a single criminal
objective.
Here, appellant's single objective was to maliciously assault
the victim, and in so doing, he committed the separate crimes
-~
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of aggravated assault and aggravated burglary.

Roth crimes

are closely related in time ana incident to his criminal
objective.

Thus, responnent was entitled to join these

different crimes in separate counts in the same information.
Utah Code Ann.,

~

However,

77-35-9 (1953), as amended.
~

77-35-9(d) provides that:

If it appears that a defendant or the
prosecution is prejudiced by a joinder of
offenses in an indictment or information
• • • the court shall order an election of
separate trials of separate counts • • •
or provide such other relief as justice
requires.
Appellant was not prejudiced because there was sufficient time
between joinder and the date of trial for counsel to prepare a
defense.

Since appellant's claim is insufficient time to

prepare a defense, it can profitably he compared to analogous
claims arising from a trial court's refusal to grant a
continuance.
In State v. McOueen, 14 Utah 2d 311, 383 P.2d 921
(lq~3),

the defendant was charged with the crime of robbery.

Following a dispute, the defendant dismissed his counsel less
than two days before trial.
for the defendant.

~he

court appointed other counsel

Shortly before trial defense counsel moved

for a continuance and the trial court denied the motion.
Following his conviction, the defendant appealed, contenainq
that the trial court's refusal to grant a continuance was
abuse of discretion.

Affirming the conviction, this Court

-6-
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concluded from the record that defense counsel was given
adequate time to prepare for trial.

See also:

Johnson v.

State, 90 Nev. 352, 52~ P.2d 969 (1974) (change in counsel on
eve of trial and motion to continue denied).
In the instant case, the interim period between·
joinder and trial of four days, provided defense counsel
sufficient time to prepare a defense to the refiled charge.
More importantly, defense counsel was tol~ in a r>hone
conversation on or before November 27, 19Rl that respondent
intended to refile on the aggravated burglary charge.

Based

upon this information, appellant can hardly claim surprise.
Furthermore, preparation for the alibi defense woulo not be
altered at all following refiling of the

a~gravated

burglary

charge because the charges arose from the same criminal
episode.
Appellant claims, however, that he was allowed
insufficient time to investigate another defense to the
refiled aggravated burglary charge:

whether the victim had

consented to appellant's entry onto the premises.

The issue

of consent is a question of fact discoverable from the parties
to whom and from whom the consent was given--i. e., the
appellant and the victim.

Since this issue of consent is

rather limited, appellant strains a bit when he contends that
four days was not adequate time to fully explore the issue.
The recorn .does not support appellant's claim that
he was prejudicea by joinder of the charges.

Thus, the trial

-iSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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court properly joined the aggravated burglary charge with the
aggravated assault charge.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO ARRAIGN THE
DEFENDANT ON THE CHARGE OF AGGRAVATED
BURGLARY WAS NOT REVERSIBLE ERROR.
In a February 17, 1982 hearing following trial,
appellant moved the court for a new trial contending that he
had not been formally arraigned on the aggravated burglary
charge~refiled

on November 30, 1981 (T 235, 240).

The court

denied appellant's motion, ruling that the clerk at the start
of trial read the information to appellant and that the clerk
indicated that a not guilty plea had been entered, placing
into issue all claims made by respondent (T. 254).
Appellant contends that this error is sufficiently
egregious as to warrant a new trial.

However, the law is well

settled that if a defendant proceeds to trial without
objecting to a failure to arraign on a charge, he waives his
right to a formal arraignment, e.g., People v. Sanders, 80
Ill. App. 3d 809, 400 N.E.2d 468 (1980): State v. Anderson, 12
Wash. App. 171, 528 P.2d 1003 (1974).

See State v. Budau, R6

N.M. 21, 518 P.2d 1225 (1974) (formal arraignment is not an
indispensable stage in a criminal proceeding).
The facts of Anderson, supra, are sufficiently
similar to those of the instant case to allow comparison.
-8-
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There, the defendant was charged in an initial information of
violating a firearms regulation and taking an automobile
without the owner's consent.

Eight days later the defendant

was arraigned on the two charges.

In the interim an amended

information was filed against defendant charging two counts of
burglary.

Defendant, however, was never arraigned on the

amended information.

Following a trial on the merits, the

defendant was found guilty of all charges.

In a hearing

following trial, the defendant moved the court for a new trial
because he had not been arraigned on the burglary charges.
The trial court denied the motion and the defendant appealed.
Affirming the conviction, the Washington Court of Appeals
held:
The record shows defendant had a full
trial on the merits as if a plea of not
guilty had been entered on the two counts.
He proceeded to trial without objection
and without asking for a continuance after
announcing he was ready to proceed to
trial. By his conduct defendant
effectively waived his right to a formal
arraignment [citations omitted].
we find no violation of due process.
528 P.2d at 1005.
Here, as in Anderson, the appellant had actual
notice of the refiled charge and had a full trial on the
merits as if he had pled not guilty.

By proceeding to trial

without objection, appellant waived his right to a formal
arraignment.

Furthermore, before the start of trial all
-9-
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charges were read to the appellant along with a statement that
a plea of not guilty had been entered.

Any error committed

effected no substantial rights of the appellant and was thus
harmless.

Utah Code Ann., S 77-35-30 (1953), as amended.

Therefore, the trial court properly denied appellant's motion
for a new trial.
POINT· III
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY RULED THAT
RESPONDENT WOULD BE PERMITTED TO REBUT
APPELLANT'S ALIBI WITNESS.
In a hearing outside the presence of the jury, the
respondent informed the court that it intended to put on
Officer Dean Holdaway to rebut the testimony of Mrs. Levan
Seeley, an alibi witness (T. 170).

Officer Holdaway was to

testify about a statement made by Mrs. Seeley at the time of
the crime that would be inconsistent with her alibi testimony
(T. 171).

Appellant objected because Officer Holdaway's name

had not been submitted to him as a possible rebuttal witness
(T. 17.2).

The respondent stated that Mrs. Seeley was not

identified as the person making the inconsistent statement
until the day before trial; thus notice to appellant could not
be given (T. 169).

Following this exchange, the trial court

ruled that putting on Officer Holdaway as a rebuttal witness
was proper (T. 172).

On

this appeal, appellant claims the

trial court ruling was erroneous.
-10-
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Section 77-14-2, Utah Code Ann. (1953), as amended,
states in pertinent part:
(1) • •• The prosecuting attorney, not
more than five days after receipt of the
[defendant's alibi] list provided herein
07 at such other time as the court may
direct, shall file and serve the defendant
with the addresses, as particularly as are
known to him, of the witnesses the state
proposes to offer to contradict or impeach
the defendant's alibi evidence.

...

(3) If a defendant or prosecuting attorney
fails to comply with the requirements of
this section, the court mav exclude
evidence offered to establish or rebut
alibi. However the defendant may always
testify on his own behalf concerning
alibi.
(4) The court may, for good cause shown,
waive the requirements of this section.
In State v. Case, Utah, 547 P.2d 221 (1976), this
Court addressed facts and issues similar to those raised in
the instant case.

There, defendant ws charged with aggravated

robbery and during trial asserted a defense based upon alibi.
Days after the robbery, a friend of the defendant confronted
the victim store clerk and stated that the defendant was the
culprit.

During testimony at trial, the friend denied making

the statement and the store clerk was recalled as a rebuttal
witness although no notice had been given the defendant.
Following conviction, the defendant appealed to this court
alleging as reversible error the State's failure to give
notice of rebuttal witnesses.

Affirming the conviction, this

Court held:
-11-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

[N]evertheless in this matter defendant
knew that [the store clerk) would become a
witness against the defendant and her
testimony respecting the conversation with
[defendant's friend] would have been known
to the defendant had it been inquired
into.
fHis friend) havinq been subpoenaed
by the defendant was undoubtedly
interviewed bv the defendant or his
counsel and w~ must assume that the
defennant was apprised fully of his
knowleoge of the facts he would testify to
if called.
There is no showing that the
prosecution intentionally attempted to
make anv concealment of the facts
reqardi~g the alibi or its refutation.
We
are of the opinion that the trial court
was justified in waiving the requirements
of the statute.
Id. at 523 (emphasis added).

Enlarging upon its Case holding,

this Court, in State v. Haddenham, Utah, 585 P.2d 447 (1978),
stated:
If defendant's implied knowledge_ as to the
State's rebuttal witnesses would justify
waiving the statutory requirements in the
rcase] case, then a fortiori such analvsis
should hold true where the rebuttal
~
witnesses had both already testified and
defennant actually knew the content of
their testimony.
Id. at 44A.
In the instant case, appellant knew that Officer
Holda\1ay would be called as an adverse witness and appellant
also had implied knowledge about Mrs. Seeley's conversation
with Holdaway had he inquired thereof.

Furthermore, Holdaway,

the rebuttal witness, had actually testified earlier.

Thus,

-12-
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-

invoking Case and Haddenham , the trial court properly ruled
that respondent could put on its rebuttal witness without
notice to the appellant.
POINT IV
ANY IMPROPRIETY IN A QUESTION PROPOUNDED
BY RESPONDENT DID NOT·- AFFECT THE
SUBSTANTIAL RIGHTS OF APPELLANT AND THUS
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED HIS MOTION
FOR A NEW TRIAL.
During presentation of the defense, the appellant
called as a witness Evan Reid (T. 179).

During cross-

examination of this witness, respondent asked "Mr. Reid, are
you Mr. Peterson's parole officer?" (T. 180).

To

this

question appellant interposed an objection which was sustained
by the trial court (T. 181).

Based in part upon this

question, appellant moved for a new trial (T. 244).

The

motion was denied by the trial court (T 254), and raised as
error on appellant's appeal before this Court.
Section 77-35-24(a), Utah Code Ann. (1953), as
amended, states:
The court may, upon motion of a party or
upon its own initiative, grant a new trial
in the interest of justice if there is any
error or impropriety which had a
substantial adverse effect upon the rights
of a party.
Consideration of Case, supra, is also instructive in
the resolution of this issue.

There, during examination of a
-13-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

witness, inadvertent reference was made to the fact that the
defendant had left the prison the day before the alleged
crime.

The defendant moved for a mistrial which was denied by

the court.

Following his conviction, the defendant appealed,

claiming as error the court's denial of the mistrial Motion.
Affirming the conviction, this Court held that denial of a
mistrial was proper because no further mention was made by
either counsel or the court about defendant's prison term and
the prosecution did not intentionally seek to elicit the
information.

547 P.2d at 223.

In an effort to distinguish the instant case from
Case and to come within the ambit

of~

77-35-24(a), appellant

claims that the question asked Mr. Reid was an intentional
effort to discredit him.

The record contains no evidence that

the State intended to discredit appellant,' nor did counsel
raise such a claim in the conference convened to consider the
objection.

In fact, during the new trial motion hearing, the

State claimed the question was only designed to obtain the

..

witness' occupation (T. 248).

Furthermore, any person sitting

as a witness may be examined about his background and
occupation for the purpose of aiding the jury in its
evaluation of the witness' testimony and credibility.

State

v. Brewer, 26 Ariz. App. 408, 549 P.2d 188, 195 (1976).
Thus, the offending question was neither intended to
discredit appellant nor did it have a substantial adverse
effect upon his rights.

Therefore the trial court properly

denied the new trial motion.
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POINT V
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY RF.FUSBD
APPELLANT'S MOTION TO STRI~~ THF. WOP~
"AC1G'RAVATED" FROM ALL COUNTS OF THE
INFORMATION.
After the State concludea its case in chief ana
during a hearing outside the presence of the jury, the
appellant moved the court to strike the word "aqgravated" from
each count in the information.

The court below denied the

motion, and appellant claims this denial was error.
Utah Code

Ann.,~

76-5-l03(l)(b) (l<l53), as amended,

prov ides:
A person commits aggravated assault
if he commits assault as defined in
section 76-5-102 ana:
He uses a aeadly weapon or such means or
force likely to proouce death or serious
bodily injury.
Appellant's attack on the trial court's order is premised upon
his conclusion that the victim, Sandra Dotson, suffered no
serious bodily injury.

Appellant relies upon State of Utah in

the Interest of William N. Besendorfer, Utah, 568 P.2d 742
( 1977) and claims that because the victim there suffered more
severe injuries than Sandra and since this Court ruled that
the injuries to the victim there were the result of an
assault, not aggravated assault, the trial court here erred
when it denied appellant's motion.

Appellant's analysis,

-15-
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however, is fundamentally flawed.

It was the position of the

respondent, and the fair import of the evidence presented,
that appellant used "such means of force likely to produce
death" and not necessarily to produce serious bodily injury
(T. 166).

Since the aggravated assault statute is stated in

the disjunctive, such a showing is sufficient.

It is not

necessary to prove death or serious bodily injury occurred,
but only that the actor used means or force likely to have
that result.
The facts contained within the record show that
appellant attacked Sandra, placed both hands around her neck
and applied sufficient pressure to cause her to black out.
Clearly, such force would likely have caused her death had not
Sandra's daughter and neighbor appeared to frighten appellant
away.

Thus, the facts presented in the State's case in chief

were sufficient to require appellant to put on its defense to
the aggravated assault charge.
Appellant also contends that the alleged

b~rglary

was not aggravated and thus the word "aggravated" should have
been stricken from the information.

Utah Code Ann., S 76-2-

203( 1) (b) ( 1953), as amended, states:
A person is guilty of aggravated burglary
if in attempting, committing, or fleeing
from a burglary, the actor or another
participant in the crime causes physical
injury to any person who is not a
participant in the crime.
-16-
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The requirement here is physical injury, not serious bodily
injury, and it is a term equivalent to "bodily injury" defined
in Utah Code Ann.,~ 76-l-60l(a) (1953), as amended:

"'Bodily

injury' means physical pain, illness, or any impairment of
physical condition."

Due to appellant's attack, the victim,

Sandra Dotson, certainly suffered as a minimum physical pain
and some impairment of physical condition; thus appellant's
conduct falls within the ambit of

s

76-6-

203( l) (a), the aggravated burglary statute •
. '

/

Appellant also argues that since S 76-6-203 is based

upon "physical injury", a term not statutorily defined, it
must be void for vagueness.

This claim is groundless because

the term "physical injury" is equivalent to the term "bodily
injury" which is defined by the Utah Criminal Code.

It is

also a phrase of common meaning which needs no further
definition.
In sum, appellant in his attack caused bodily injury
and used such force that was likely to produce

death~

thus the

trial court properly denied his motion to strike the word
"aggravated" from all counts in the information.
POINT VI
THE $10,000 FINE IMPOSED AT SENTENCING WAS
NEITHER EXCESSIVE NOR AN ABUSE OF TRIAL
COURT DISCRETION.
For appellant's conviction for aggravated burglary,
a first-degree felony, the trial court imposed a fine of
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$10,000 (T. 232, 233).

On this appeal, appellant claims that

the fine was excessive and disproportionate to the seriousness
of the offense.
Utah Code

Ann.,~

76-3-20l(l)(a) (1953), as amended,

states:
Within the limits prescribed by this
chapter, a court may sentence a person
adjudged guilty of an offense to any one
of the following sentences or combination
of such sentences:
(a) To pay a fine~ or • • •
In addition, Utah Code Ann., S 76-3-301(1) (1953), as amended,
states:
A person who has been convicted of an
offense may be sentenced to pay a fine not
exceeding $10,000 when the conviction is
of a felony of the first degree.
In State v. Harris, Utah, 585 P.2d 450, 453 (1978), this Court
further noted:
Upon conviction of a crime whether by
verdict or by plea, the matter of the
sentence imposed rests entirely within the
discretion of the court, within the limits
prescribed by law (emphasis added).
Appellant claims, however, that since neither of the
victims incurred pennanent injuries, disfigurement or longterm medical expenses, imposition of the fine was abuse of
trial court discretion.

The purpose of a fine is not solely

for making restitution to one's victims.

Thus, Utah Code

-18-
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Thus, Utah Code Ann., S 76-1-104 states in relevant part:
The provisions of [the Utah Criminal
Code] shall be construed in accordance
with these general purposes.
(1) Forbid and prevent the commission of
offenses. • • •
(3) Prescribe penalties which are
proportionate to the seriousness of
offenses and which permit recognition of
differences in rehabilitation
possibilities among individual offenders.
The trial court, in effecting

~

-··76-1-104, could have decided

that in this particular case the maximum fine, together with
imprisonment, would most clearly deter the appellant from
future crime and most appropriately punish him for crimes
already committed.

Based upon this view of the sentencing

procedure and the seriousness of appellant's crime, the fine
imposed was neither excessive nor abuse of trial court
discretion.
POINT VII
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY PERMITTED THE
STATE TO AMEND THE INFORMATION AT THE
CLOSE OF _,ITS CASE.
on the second day of trial in a hearing outside the
presence of the jury, the State moved the court to amend the
information so that

§

7n-5-103(l)(b) would be the basis for

the aggravated assault charge instead of§ 76-5-103(l)(a).
The state argued that such an amendment would more clearly
-19-
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reflect the evidence already presented (T. 166).

over

appellant's objection the trial court granted the motion
amending the information (T. 167).
The appellant argued during the motion, and argues
here, that he had come prepared to defend the aggravated
assault charge on the basis of§ 76-5-103(l)(a), serious
bodily injury, not

§

76-5-103(l)(b), force likely to produce

death.
Utah Code

Ann.,~

77-35-4(d) (1953), as amended,

permits an "information to be amended at any time before
verdict if no additional or different offense is charged and
the substantial rights of the defendant are not prejudiced."
Appellant admits that no additional or different offense was
charged, but he argues that his substantial rights were
prejudiced by the amendment.

However, weighing the evidence

presented at trial up to the time of the motion, such a claim
is groundless.
Utah Code Ann.,§ 76-l-60l(a) (1953), as amended,
defines "serious bodily injury" as a:
bodily injury that creates or causes
serious permanent disfigurement,
protracted loss or impairment of the
function of any bodily member or organ or
creates a substantial risk of death.
The record indicates that the victim, Sandra Dotson, did not
suffer pennanent disfigurement or loss of a body member or
organ, but was placed under a substantial risk of death.
-20-
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·~.

Essentially, for this particular case, ~ 76-5-103( 1) (a) was
eqivalent to§ 76-5-103(l)(b) because the force used by
appellant was likely to produce death.

Furthermore, the

amended information would require no change in appellant's
defense at trial nor would additional preparation be required.
This Court recently decided State v. Ricci, Utah,
P.2d

(Case No. 18165, filed September 29, 1982) in

which the appellant contended it was error to allow an
amendment to the information after the parties rested to
I

include the language "or remained in" in a burglary charge.
Appellant made the same claim in Ricci as is advanced here, to
which this Court responded:
This contention is without merit
since the amendment did not change the
basic charge from the burglary alleged to
some other charge. The information
charged defendant by Title and Section,
which apprised him of the statutory
offense and which included the very phrase
about which defendant now takes issue.
Id. at p. 2 of the opinion.

Since no substantial rights of

appellant were prejudiced, the trial court properly permitted
the information to be amended.
POINT VIII
RESPONDENT PRESENTED SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE
AT TRIAL TO SUPPORT APPELLANT'S
CONVICTION.
Appellant argues that evidence proffered in support
of his alibi was sufficiently compelling to render
-21-
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insufficient, as a matter of law, that evidence.which
reasonably supports his conviction.
When faced with an insufficiency of evidence claim,
this Court accords great deference to conclusions reached by
the jury in matters solely within its province:
It is the exclusive function of the jury
to weigh the evidence and to determine the
credibility of the witnesses, and it is
not within the prerogative of this Court
to substitute its judgment for that of the
factfinder. This Court should only
interfere when the evidence is so lacking
and insubstantial that reasonable men
could not possibly have reached a verdict
beyond a reasonable doubt.
State v. Lamm, Utah,
added).

60~

P.2d 229, 231 (1980) (emphasis

Thus, this Court's function is not to determine guilt

or innocence, the weight to give conflicting evidence, or the
credibility of witnesses.

State v. Lamm, supra: State v.

Gorlick, Utah, 605 P.2d 761 (1979).

In State v. Logan, Utah,

563 P.2d 811, 814 (1977), this Court recast its review
standard in rather succinct terms:

"[U]nless there is a clear

showing of lack of evidence, the jury verdict will be upheld."
Furthermore, this Court has stated that its review of the
evidence and those inferences reasonably deduced therefrom
will be conducted in the light most favorable to the jury
verdict.

State v. Kerekes, Utah, 622 P.2d 1161, 1168 (1980).

In addition, the defendant bears the burden of establishing
that the evidence presented at his trial was so inconclusive
-22-
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and insubstantial that reasonable minds must have entertained
a reasonable doubt concerning his guilt for the crime charged.
Id. at 1168.
The only credible evidence presented at trial which
supported appellant's alibi was the testimony of appellant's
father.

His father, Mr. Charles Peterson, testified that he

heard appellant come home at 5:30 a.m. on September 1, 1981
(T. 151).

Although Charles Peterson did not see his son come

home, he heard the gate open and moments later heard the
refrigerator door open (T. 151, 159).

The probative value of

Charles Peterson's testimony is further reduced because his
sister-in-law and her husband were also living in the Peterson
house (T. 157).
Most damaging, however, is the positive eyewitness
identification of appellant by Sandra and Tammy Dotson and
their two neighbors.

When viewing the totality of the

evidence in a light most favorable to the jury verdict, a
reasonable mind would entertain no reasonable doubt about
appellant's guilt.

Therefore, his conviction was supported by

sufficient evidence.
CONCLUSION
Appellant was accorded a complete and fair trial
which resulted in a conviction overwhelmingly supported by
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the evidence.

Therefore, respondent respectfully requests

this Honorable Court affirm appellant's conviction.
Respectfully submitted this 13th day of April, 1983.
DAVID L. WILKINSON

A&;;j~~
ROBERT N. PARRISH
Assistant Attorney General
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